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Liberal Constitutionalism and the
Unsettling of the Secular
Benjamin L Berger*

INTRODUCTION
Our constitutional theories are constructed on a foundation of prior
claims about the character of the social world. These foundational social
understandings lend support and offer resources to the constitutional
ideas and practices that they undergird. Indeed, they serve as the implicit
conditions of plausibility for the accounts that we give about the nature
and operation of constitutionalism and what we ask constitutional law to
achieve. When elements of that substructure of assumptions or claims
about the social world are unsettled or disrupted, gaps, cracks, and frailties
in the constitutional superstructure are exposed. This relationship can be
examined from either direction. Becoming alive to inconsistencies, trouble
spots, or new perplexities in constitutional practice and theory, we might
be moved to ask what has changed about the social facts – or our
awareness of them – that otherwise lend coherence and stability to those
theories and practices. Or seized with new or different understandings of,
or newly aware of different facts about, the social world, we might wonder
*
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Sossin, and Jacob Weinrib as I worked through the ideas in this piece, and I am grateful to them
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what impact this has on the stability and coherence of our approach to
constitutional law.
And so, for example, a prior assumption about relative income
equality or economic opportunity makes more plausible a certain set of
claims about the role and nature of constitutional law. A more traditionally
liberal approach to constitutions and constitutional rights sits more or less
comfortably on that foundation, and a neo-liberal constitutionalism might
thrive on it, approaching constitutionalism as a regulatory device in
service of a promising free market.1 Our attention turned to homelessness,
poverty, and radical income inequality, gaps open up in those accounts
and practices. The absence of social and economic rights in a constitutional
order now appears as a fundamental gap, not merely a question of
institutional competence and a requirement for state action,2 and we will
be more inclined to think about liberal constitutions as devices of wealth
and property protection.
In this chapter, I suggest that certain features of our constitutional
theories and practices have been more dependent than we have heretofore
acknowledged on an implicit faith in the character and success of
secularism. In particular, I have in mind what we might call a ‘folk’ 3
understanding of secularism: one that imagines a more or less workable
divide between religion and law/politics and that maps something like a
general reduction in the public salience of religious belief, belonging, and
practice. Reflection on modern constitutional practice has proceeded
rather comfortably on an imaginative foundation in which some such
understanding of secularism has been part of the furniture of the modern
political and social order. In this respect, liberal constitutional theory has

1

See Bernard E Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural
Order (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2011).
2

See Gavin W Anderson, ‘Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism’ (2004)
17 CJLJ 31.
3

I am drawing inspiration here from Sally Falk Moore’s classic description of a ‘folk’
understanding of law as a procedural tool at the disposal of states to achieve functional ends.
Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1978).

2
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simply participated in the common sense of most modern social and
political reflection, in which
[t]he separation of the state and of its various institutions,
including law, from religion, and with this the religious
neutrality of the state (and the political neutering of religion),
has been conceived as not only central to the emergence of
this new order, but also necessary for its preservation and for
the achievement of the justice that it is supposed to
guarantee.4
This underlying assumption about the secular character of the social world
has lent certain resources to liberal constitutional theory and made
possible particular ideas about the nature of our constitutional lives, laws,
and practices.
And yet the character – indeed, the existence – of this secularism
has come into question. The conviction that our political and social lives
can be satisfyingly described by that ‘folk’ account of secularism has been
seriously destabilized by experience and theory alike. It turns out that the
facts surrounding our social lives elude and exceed the containers relied
upon by this understanding of secularism, and scholars have shown that
secularism is a much more complex, untidy, and inconvenient concept.
The best understanding of secularism is a matter of significant debate; that
we are now denied a simple or stable concept of secularism on which to
lean is not.
The question at the heart of this chapter is the following: What
happens when we fold this emergent awareness of the instability of
secularism back into accounts of the character of constitutions, their
legitimacy, and the nature of constitutional adjudication?5 In essence, I am

4

Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert Yelle and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, ‘Introduction’ in
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert Yelle and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo (eds), After Secular Law
(Stanford, Stanford Law Books, 2011) 1.
5

Recent scholarship has generated a more complicated relationship between religion and law,
showing ways in which the religious and the legal are far messier and less distinct. See eg
Sullivan et al., After Secular Law. For example, the political theology literature has troubled the
relationship between religion and the rule of law, writ large, as have historical accounts of the
emergence of modern law. See, eg, Paul W Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the
Concept of Sovereignty (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011); James Q Whitman, The

3
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asking whether the success of central aspects of contemporary
constitutional theory and practice is tethered to the fate of a certain
understanding of the secular. The stresses of religious difference that have
disturbed confidence in sociological and political claims about the
character and demands of secularism may lead us to question our comfort
with the orthodoxies – and unsettle certain idées fixes – of contemporary
liberal constitutionalism. Faith in the secular character of the social world
– understood in a particular way – has afforded certain analytical
resources for constitutional law and possibilities for how we might
understand contemporary constitutionalism. Denied those possibilities
and resources, we see certain gaps or shortcomings in prevailing accounts
of liberal constitutionalism. In particular, and drawing heavily from the
Canadian example, this chapter explores the way in which the facts
associated with this unsettling of secularism trouble theories that position
proportionality as the central feature of modern constitutional life,
challenge the centrality of rights constitutionalism in constitutional
thought and practice, and ultimately raise questions about the ground for
constitutional authority and legitimacy, pointing to the abiding salience of
claims about sovereignty in modern constitutionalism. Put under pressure
by the social facts surrounding religion and politics, as this part of the
foundation unsteadies and begins to shake, vulnerabilities and
deficiencies in our constitutional theory are revealed.
To be clear, the claim is not that the social facts surrounding
religion, law, and politics are responsible for generating or producing
those faults or shortcomings, as though but for an instability in secularism,
the edifice would be solid and sound. Rather, these faults are latent in the
architecture (in the assumptions and ideology) of liberal constitutional
theory and practice, and are simply exposed by tracing the effects of a
disruption in the secular. As I alluded to at the outset of this chapter, other
shifts in our understanding of the social world are eminently capable of
doing similar diagnostic work. But it is true that religion seems
particularly adept at, if not uniquely able to, trouble the conceits of liberal

Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial (New Haven, Yale
University Press, 2008).

4
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constitutionalism. It is, therefore, to the unsettling of the ‘folk’ idea of
secularism that I now turn.
THE UNSETTLING OF SECULARISM
Over the past many years, the concept of the secular has been under
siege by social and political theorists and philosophers who have contested
its meaning, history, and character, exploring both the range of social and
political phenomena that ‘secularism’ can describe, and the political ends
that it can serve. José Casanova, for example, famously distinguished
between secularism as a claim about the overall reduction in religious
adherence in society and secularism as designating a privatization of
religion.6 Years later, in his conceptual history of the secular, A Secular Age,
Charles Taylor added a third way of understanding secularism to this
definitional mix. Secularism, for Taylor, centrally describes an imaginative
shift in which religion and a religious life slowly became but one option
among others for a life of human flourishing– his so-called ‘secularism 3’.7
These kinds of definitional debates have been accompanied by a
growing awareness of the diverse range of political configurations that can
subsist under the capacious umbrella of the term ‘secularism’. The
contrasting archetypes of French laïcité and American free exercise or
Anglo-multiculturalism (themselves misleading as to the forms of
religious and political life lived in those countries) 8 have featured
prominently in commentary about the nature and demands of the secular.
In a pivotal moment in debates about the management of religious
diversity in Canada, Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor labelled these

6

José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1994).
7

Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 2007).

8

John R Bowen, Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009).

5
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competing models ‘closed’ and ‘open’ secularism,9 whereas Tariq Modood
prefers to describe these main historical strands as ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’
secularism.10
Yet the pluralization of secularism goes well beyond two archetypal
models. Scholars point to the diverse and varied local practices and
settlements collected within these two broad categories, as well as wholly
different ways of structuring the relationship between state power and
religion, leaving us with ‘varieties of secularisms’, rather than a single
concept of the secular.11 The variety of forms of the secular, and the various
relationships between religion and state institutions that the concept
seems to embrace, is such that it seems dangerous to claim that
‘secularism’ demands much of anything in particular.12
And so a deep indeterminacy has settled in around the concept of
the secular, to the extent that it seeks to offer or describe a specific
regulatory ideal for how to keep the state and its authority and institutions
separate from religion. Indeed, if it points to something, it may be that
‘secularism’ marks the involvement of the state in matters of religion, not
their insulation from one another. This is Talal Asad’s claim, pointing as
he does to the way in which secularism bears the imprint of its historical
formation in contact with Christianity and is still, in fact, defined by its

9

Quebec, Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accomodement reliées aux différences
culturelles, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, by Gérard Bouchard and Charles
Taylor (Quebec City, Gouvernement du Québec, 2008).
10

Tariq Modood, ‘Is There a Crisis of Secularism in Western Europe?’ (2012) 73 Sociology of
Religion 130.
11

Janet R Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (eds), Secularisms (Durham, NC, Duke University Press,
2008). Rajeev Bhargava points to India as a source for a model of secularism built on ideas of
‘principled distance’ and ‘contextual secularism’: ‘States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of
Secularism’ (2010) 10 The Hedgehog Review 8.
12

I discuss this problem of being caught between the particular and the universal in claims about
the character of the secular in Benjamin L Berger, ‘Belonging to Law: Religious Difference,
Secularism, and the Conditions of Civic Inclusion’ (2015) 24 Social & Legal Studies 47. More
generally, I discuss the risks – both conceptual and material – inherent in the legal use of the
concept of the secular in Benjamin L Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the
Claims of Constitutionalism (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2015).
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relationship with and involvement in religion. 13 And it is Agrama’s
essential claim when he explains that ‘[i]t is secularism itself that
incessantly blurs together religion and politics in Egypt’.14 Secularism, for
Agrama, is not a determinate concept or institutional configuration but,
rather, a ‘problem-space’ that draws the state into asking and seeking to
answer questions about religion. Marching under the banner of
‘secularism’, state institutions must ask and answer questions about the
nature and definition of religion, about the meaning of religious symbols
and practices, and about the location of the boundary between religion and
state. ‘Thus’, he explains, ‘what best characterizes secularism is not a
separation between religion and politics, but an ongoing, deepening
entanglement in the question of religion and politics, for the purpose of
identifying and securing fundamental liberal rights and freedoms’.15
Meanwhile, alongside this growing conceptual instability around
the idea of the secular, we have watched as social facts have belied the folk
conception of what modern secularity entails. Religion is simply more
muscularly present, more persistently assertive, in ‘secular’ states than this
understanding allows or than the so-called ‘secularization thesis’ – the idea
that, within modernity, religion and religiosity would experience steady
decline – predicted. There has been a kind of renewed awareness – or
rediscovery – of the public salience of religion. Bhargava argues that, in
this sense, secularism is a concept very much under strain. He goes so far
as to describe this as a perceived ‘crisis’ of secularism and explains that, to
a considerable extent, the pressure exerted on the descriptive account of
an increasingly non-religious political world is a result of migration and
the growing presence of Muslims in Europe. As Bhargava explains, ‘the
crisis of secular states in Europe is due, in part, because the secular
humanist ethos endorsed by many citizens is not fully shared, particularly

13

See eg Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2003); Talal Asad, ‘French Secularism and the “Islamic Veil Affair”’
(2003) 8 The Hedgehog Review 93.
14

Hussein Ali Agrama, ‘Sovereign Power and Secular Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a
Religious State?’ in Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert Yelle and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo (eds),
After Secular Law (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) ch 9, 184.
15

Ibid, 186.
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by those who have newly acquired citizenship’.16 Though he is writing of
Europe, similar trends are evident in North America and elsewhere in the
world. 17 Bhargava sums up the character and source of this ‘crisis of
secularism’ as the ‘new reality of the vibrant presence of multiple religions
in public life and the accompanying social tensions’.18
Modood argues that to claim that there is a ‘crisis of secularism’ in
Europe ‘is not only exaggerated but misleading’.19 For him, ‘[t]he ‘crisis of
secularism’ is really the challenge of multiculturalism’. 20 And yet he
nevertheless agrees that ‘[p]olitical secularism has been destabilized, in
particular the historical flow from a moderate to radical secularism and
the expectation of its continuation has been jolted’. 21 Modood explains
that, with the demographic and social changes associated with deeper
religious diversity, ‘it slowly becomes apparent that the secularist status
quo, with certain residual privileges for Christians, is untenable as it
stands’.22
But of course, the energetic persistence of religion in public life is
far from exclusively a matter of increased religious difference born of
demographic change, immigration, or the political presence of Islam.
Canvassing the case law and scholarship around the world, one sees that
the disruption of the expected historical flow toward the more thorough
separation of religion and public life that Modood describes – what he calls
the destabilization of political secularism – is also a product of assertive
expressions of Christianity in political policies, social life, and legal
debates. 23 This, too, is a significant source of the ‘vibrant presence of

16

Bhargava, ‘Crisis of Secularism’, 11.

17

Anuradha Dingwaney Needham and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan (eds), The Crisis of Secularism in
India (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2007).
18

Bhargava, ‘Crisis of Secularism’, 12.

19

Modood, ‘Western Europe’, 146.

20

Ibid.

21

Ibid, 145.

22

Ibid.

23

See, eg, Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free
Enterprise (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2009); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan,
Prison Religion: Faith-Based Reform and the Constitution (Princeton, Princeton University
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multiple religions in public life and the accompanying social tensions’.24
In short, as we look around our social world, the folk account of
‘secularism’ seems simply not to describe what we see. Religion has not
retreated into the private realm, withdrawing from the domain of politics
and law, nor does it appear to be poised to do so.
Tested, questioned, and challenged by these historical,
philosophical, and sociological observations, an understanding of the
modern state as ‘secular’ has been seriously unsettled. It fails to
satisfyingly capture what we see happening in our social and political
lives, and, with its range of meanings and encoded partiality, no longer
seems to offer itself as a response to or a tool for managing religious
difference. Reveries of secularism seem to have been disturbed by
inconvenient social and historical facts. And as the concept of secularism
has become descriptively and normatively unstable, new questions are
raised as to the character of the modern state that it sought to describe.
Some have responded by describing the condition in contemporary
western societies as, instead, ‘post-secular’.25 Although this moniker has
itself attracted a range of meanings and definitions, 26 the term draws
attention to the untidiness and complexity of the role of religion in modern
society, ‘[highlighting] the active, even robust, presence of religion … or,
at the very least, the recognition of religious ideas as normatively
“legitimate” and persuasive to many’, 27 as well as the deep normative
diversity (referred to as the ‘fragmentation of meaning’ by some)28 that
defines the contemporary condition.

Press, 2009); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of
Religion (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015).
24

Bhargava, ‘Crisis of Secularism’, 12.

25

See, eg, Jürgen Habermas, ‘Notes on Post-Secular Society’ (2008) 25 New Perspectives
Quarterly 17. Arif Jamal offers a helpful and compendious description of the ideas that have
collected around the term ‘post-secular’ in his ‘Considering Freedom of Religion in a PostSecular Context: Hapless or Hopeful?’ (2017) 6 Oxford J of Law & Religion 433.
26

James Beckford, ‘SSSR Presidential Address – Public Religions and the Post-secular: Critical
Reflections’ (2012) 51 J for the Scientific Study of Religion 1.
27

Jamal, ‘Considering Freedom of Religion’, 436.

28

See Zachary R Calo, ‘Religion, Human Rights, and Post-Secular Legal Theory’ (2011) 85 St
John’s L Rev 495; Jamal, ‘Considering Freedom of Religion’, 436–7.
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This brings us to the question at the heart of this piece: how might
this unsettling of secularism trouble contemporary constitutional theory
and practice? What gaps, cracks, or shortcomings in prevailing accounts
of liberal constitutionalism appear when they are denied the support of
the stabilizing ideas associated with secularism?
CONSEQUENCES FOR LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM?
A more or less stable, confident claim about secularism –
understood as the separation of religion from politics, law, and state
institutions – offers certain resources to constitutional theory and practice.
It puts pieces in play to be relied upon when developing our
understandings of constitutional law and practice. There is, for example, a
vision of the good citizen implied by concepts of the secular: someone who
can understand religion as a discrete and therefore manageable
component of their lives; someone thereby fitted to a sense of the social
and political in which the private/public divide is an organizing principle;
someone whose interests and concerns are largely immanent. Similarly, as
I will explore below, the ability to invoke a claim about the secular
provides access to a form of normative authority that is based on the
adequacy of reasons and the success of the state’s reason-giving – an
understanding of legitimacy grounded on consensus and convergence,
and one that does not depend on resort to larger metaphysical or
ontological claims. These are but examples of the kinds of imaginative
resources that constitutional law gains by having a claim about secularism
that is felt to faithfully map the social world over which law presides. But
as secularism becomes unstable, these pieces are pulled away. We begin to
see that elements of the liberal constitutional common sense are
themselves unsteady. And what ensues is an awareness of the inadequacy
of central aspects of orthodox accounts of the character of modern liberal
constitutionalism.
In what follows, I take up certain of those core elements and,
drawing heavily from the Canadian example, explore the way in which
they are disrupted by a social world that resists the claims of secularism,
ultimately arriving at an examination of the challenges posed for how we
understand the sources of constitutional legitimacy and authority.

10
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Proportionality as the ‘Ultimate Rule of Law’ and the Key Task of ‘the Judge in a
Democracy’
The ascendancy of proportionality as the defining characteristic of
modern liberal constitutionalism is a well-observed phenomenon. 29
Proportionality is the elephant in the comparative constitutionalist’s room.
Despite persistent divergence in varieties of substantive constitutional
particulars, the idea that the essence of modern constitutionalism both can
and should be found in the logic of proportionality is a prized orthodoxy.
Proportionality has settled into the heart of Canadian constitutional life,
becoming central to how the just constitutional state is imagined. Gaining
an early foothold in the means-ends balancing test involved in the
justificatory clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1,30
the ethic or logic of proportionality has metastasized through its
absorption into administrative law, now measuring the justice of all state
decision-making.31 But the Canadian iteration of proportionality is hardly
distinctive; it is an echo of the necessity and suitability conditions found in
the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, has drawn
inspiration from Israeli understandings and experience of proportionality

29

See Paul W Kahn, ‘Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key’ (2003) 101 Michigan L Rev
2677; Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 72; Grégoire CN Webber, ‘Proportionality,
Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship’ (2010) 23 CJLJ 179; Benjamin L
Berger, ‘The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and the Modern
Constitutional Imagination’ (2011) 61 U Toronto LJ 579; Jacob Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity:
The Theory and Practice of Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2016).
30

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. This proportionality test, governing the analysis of s
1, was established in R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.
31

Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12. This expansion in the role of proportionality is an
interesting dramatization of Alexy’s theory of horizontal effect (Robert Alexy, A Theory of
Constitutional Rights (transl Julian Rivers; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 352ff),
whereby, as Kumm puts it, ‘[c]onstitutional rights norms ‘radiate’ into all areas of the legal
system … so as to affect the rights and duties of all actors within the jurisdiction’ (Mattias
Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional
Justice’ (2003) 2 ICON 574, 585.)
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review,32 and is reflective of a global common sense about the essential
character of constitutionalism.33 Proportionality has been described both
as the central practice of constitutional adjudication (the key task of ‘the
judge in a democracy’ 34 ) and the governing measure of constitutional
justice, or the ‘ultimate rule of law’.35
If one looks under the hood of proportionality, one sees that it ‘is
nothing more than the contemporary expression of reasonableness’.36 As
an account of modern constitutionalism, it rests on a particular way of
imagining the relationship between reason and state justice. Paul Kahn
makes this point when he describes the genealogy of proportionality
review, which, he claims, ‘lies in the belief that the rule of law is the
internalization of reason itself as a regulative ideal within the political
order’.37 That which is constitutional is that which is reasonable, all things
considered. For those who advance this account of the character of
constitutionalism, it is a means of imagining constitutional judgment that
‘permits disputes about the limits of legitimate lawmaking to be settled on
the basis of reason and rational argument’.38 As one scholar describes it,
this means that proportionality can ‘claim an objectivity and integrity no

32

In Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, the Supreme Court of Canada
cited and drew from Aharon Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’ (2007) 57 U
Toronto LJ 369.
33

See Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity, 215-6.

34

Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

35

David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004). There is
a rich literature debating the merits, and offering various models, of proportionality review. The
purpose of the present discussion is not to rehearse and explore those extensive debates. For an
excellent review of these debates, and for a sophisticated conception of the ‘moral structure of
proportionality’, see Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity, 215–271. For criticisms of proportionality
review see eg Grégoire CN Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009); Webber, ‘Cult of Constitutional Rights
Scholarship’; Francisco J Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2017).
36

Kahn, ‘Comparative Constitutionalism’, 2698.

37

Ibid.

38

Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law, 42.
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other model of judicial review can match’.39 Proportionality’s elevation of
reasonableness as the core logic of constitutional justice thus takes its force
and appeal in large measure from its imagined ability to suppress its
alternative – the presence of interest, identity, will, and the political in
constitutional judgment.
Yet how dependent has this picture of constitutionalism defined by
proportionality been on the success of claims about secularism? The
perduring and vital presence of religion in the public sphere troubles this
account of proportionality as the multi-tool fitted to questions of
constitutional justice. It does so, first, by challenging the adequacy of the
methods of proportionality reasoning in dealing with issues related to
religion and religious rights. Theorists have articulated different models
of how proportionality reasoning works. In some understandings,
proportionality involves a direct balancing of competing rights and
principles. 40 For others, the competing principles are instead measured
against some ‘common yardstick’41 or by reference to the extent that each
advances an underlying norm.42 In either understanding, however, when
religion is involved there must be some assessment of the constitutional
‘good’ of religion and the extent to which it is implicated in the given case.
And yet it turns out that we are unsure how to measure and weigh
religion for the purposes of constitutional analysis. 43 To do so requires
generating a theory of the constitutional value of religion and, as scholarly
39

Ibid, 171.

40

This is Alexy’s model as reflected in his ‘Law of Balancing’. See Alexy, A Theory of
Constitutional Rights.
41

Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing’, 105.

42

This is, for example, Weinrib’s conception, in which ‘the yardstick against which these
quantities are set is the ideal of public justice or human dignity under law’: Weinrib, Dimensions
of Dignity, 229. For Weinrib, this means that ‘[p]roportionality reflects the absolute duty of
government to bring the existing legal order into the deepest possible conformity with human
dignity’. Ibid, 240.
43

Others have noted the problematic character of this exercise of assigning weight to
constitutional interests, making the point by reference to other constitutional rights and interests;
the discussion often revolves around the problem of ‘incommensurability’ in constitutional
proportionality reasoning. See, eg, Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality; Webber, The
Negotiable Constitution. Again, my claim is not that religion is unique in raising this problem,
even if it is uniquely good at doing so.
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debates have shown, we are not equipped with a clear sense of what it is
about religion that attracts our constitutional regard.44 Moreover, effective
proportionality review in matters of religion would also seem to require
descending into the spiritual infrastructure of an individual or
community’s life – something to which liberal constitutionalism is allergic,
not to mention ill-equipped to do – in order to assign a ‘gravity’ to the
state’s interference with a religious practice or belief. One sees here how
much proportionality, as an account of the heart of liberal
constitutionalism, depends on an assumption about ‘the progressive
immanence of our concerns and our references’. 45 Proportionality may
work more or less well for the weighing of immanent concerns; however,
the unsettling of secularism denies us confidence that the nature of the
interests and preoccupations of those who come before the courts have
that immanent quality.
As a result, we find cases in which proportionality seems to founder
as means of assessing the constitutionally just. In Canada, one thinks of the
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony case, in which the Supreme Court was
called upon to assess whether a government requirement for photographs
on drivers’ licences was a proportional limit on the religious freedoms of
an insular agrarian Hutterite community whose interpretation of the
second commandment translated into a prohibition on having one’s
photograph taken. Drawn into the proportionality analysis that is the heart
of Canadian constitutional adjudication, the majority of the Court
explained that the burden on the members of Wilson Colony was best
characterized in terms of costs – ‘costs on the religious practitioner in terms
of money, tradition or inconvenience’ 46 – and that those costs were
relatively trivial in comparison to the state interest in a secure photo

44

For an excellent recent treatment of this problem, see Jamal, ‘Considering Freedom of
Religion’. For an example of a debate driven by the indeterminacy about the ‘good’ protected by
religion in liberal constitutions, see Christopher L Eisgruber and Lawrence G Sager, Religious
Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2007); Jeremy
Webber, ‘Understanding the Religion in Freedom of Religion’ in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and
Zoe Robinson (eds), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 26.
45

Sullivan et al., ‘Introduction’, 1.

46

Wilson Colony, [95].

14

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269536

Forthcoming in Rex Adhar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton,
Mass: Edward Elgar, 2018) (Pre-publication Version)

licensing scheme. Many have critiqued this decision as failing to capture
what was at stake for the religious community. 47 To be sure, the
assessment could have been performed better and more sensitively; and,
indeed, the dissenting judgment written by Justice Abella did a far better
job of accounting for the impacts of the photo requirement on the life of
the community. And yet, for the reasons I have described, the ability to
weigh religion seems always out of reach, pointing to a weakness in
proportionality as an analytic tool in arriving at constitutional justice.48
The point is well made by the facts of another Canadian case, AC.49
The question here was whether the religious freedom right of a 15-yearold Jehovah’s Witness entitled her to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion.
The majority of the Court avoided the core constitutional question, relying
instead on an admixture of statutory interpretation and future exercises of
discretion. The evasion was understandable. What would a
proportionality analysis that gave sensitive regard to the religious interests
in the case look like? It would have to wrestle with the subject’s
transcendent and metaphysical concerns – the immortal life of her soul –
and weigh that against the state’s interest in the preservation of life. Again,
proportionality review as a measure of the just seems to stumble over the
questions raised by religion as an assertive and insistent part of our social
worlds. Something more or different is needed to meet the judgmental
burdens imposed by such questions.

47

For my criticisms, see Benjamin L Berger, ‘Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning, and Cultural
Difference: Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony’ (2010) 51
Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 25.
48

In this vein, Kai Möller, critical of Alexy’s approach, suggests that dealing with constitutional
rights will inevitably involve moral arguments, not simply proportionality review. See Kai
Möller, ‘Balancing and the Structure of Constitutional Rights’ (2007) 5 ICON 453. It might be
that other models or accounts of proportionality, in particular those that embrace a normative
view of the balancing involved could fare better (see eg Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity, arguing
that balancing should occur in reference to ‘human dignity’, and Barak, The Judge in a
Democracy, structuring his account of balancing around ‘society’s values’). Nevertheless, the
specific issues that I have described as associated with the constitutional adjudication of religion
– understanding why we protect religion, the need to engage with the spiritual infrastructure of
religious lives, and how these impact on the weighing or balancing of religion – still pose a
challenge to these models.
49

AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30.
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Yet, beyond questioning its internal adequacy as a tool, the
instability of the secular also seems to unsettle the descriptive claim that,
in modern liberal constitutionalism, proportionality review is the key task
or the principal business of a judge in a democracy. The wish that this were
so is understandable enough. Proportionality’s foundation in formal
reason rescues the liberal constitutional judge from the messiness of
history, identity, symbolic interpretation, and the like. Describing
constitutional adjudication in terms of proportionality places the
legitimacy of judicial review on somewhat safer ground. Yet it turns out
that, faced with publicly assertive forms of religion and the associated
exposure of the residual privilege enjoyed by the religions around whom
the secular status quo was formed, judges in democracies have often
instead been preoccupied with the task of symbolic interpretation and
identity construction. And those are tasks that emphatically raise the basic
questions at the heart of debates on the legitimacy of judicial review: to
borrow from Joel Bakan’s excellent distillation, why should we trust
judges’ decisions on those kinds of issues and why would we think that
they are more likely to arrive at truth on such matters?50 Balancing and
proportionality have been part of the picture, to be sure. However, a glance
at the cases about religion that have found their way to constitutional
courts puts proportionality in its place as but one piece – and arguably not
the most significant – of what constitutional adjudication involves.
In Canada, a recent case concerning prayer at a municipal council,
Saguenay, 51 makes the point well. At issue was whether the practice of
beginning municipal council meetings in the town of Saguenay, Québec,
with a palpably Christian (and, specifically, Roman Catholic) prayer –
following which those who did not wish to be present for the prayer could
enter the council chamber – offended the freedom of religion and
conscience of non-believers. Concluding that this practice was
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court leaned on the concept of state
neutrality and explained the exclusionary communicative effects of this
public prayer. Given the complicated history of Catholicism in the

50

Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto, University of
Toronto Press, 1997).
51

Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16.

16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269536

Forthcoming in Rex Adhar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton,
Mass: Edward Elgar, 2018) (Pre-publication Version)

province of Québec, the task of the Court was to interpret the character of
this prayer (and prayer generally), assess it against the historical backdrop
of religion in Québec, imagine the communicative effect on listeners, and
make claims about the character of the modern state. Proportionality
reasoning was a marginal aspect of the decision, with these symbolic,
political, and historical claims featuring far more prominently.
The same lesson emerges as one looks at law and religion cases that
have emerged elsewhere in the world. The nature and meaning of prayer
was at the heart of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v
Galloway,52 and in Elk Grove v Nedow53 the Court ruled on the reference to
God in the pledge of allegiance, ultimately arguing that it represented a
permissible form of ‘ceremonial deism’ that needed to be understood in
the frame of American national history and identity. In the (in)famous case
of Lautsi, the pivotal task for the European Court of Human Rights was
defining the meaning of the crucifix on the walls of Italian classrooms, a
task that required reconciling the demand for state neutrality with the role
of Catholicism in shaping Italian national identity.54 That Court’s burden
in Sahin was to interpret the symbolic significance of the headscarf within
the frame of Kemalism and the Islamic revival in Turkey.55 And in JFS,56
the UK Supreme Court was called upon to rule as to whether ‘Jewishness’
was a religious or ethnic feature.
These are the kinds of cases that reflect the social facts and pressures
associated with the unsettling of the secular. By the light of such cases, the
assertion that proportionality analysis is the key task of a constitutional
judge or the central measure of constitutional justice is somewhat
mystifying. Rather than a balancing or the measuring of competing
interests against a common normative yardstick, constitutional
adjudication in matters of religion appears fundamentally as a
symbolizing practice, one whereby the courts use law to make claims
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134 S Ct 1811 (2014).
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Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004).

54

Lautsi v Italy (2011) 54 EHRR 3.
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Leyla Sahin v Turkey (2005) 44 EHRR 5.
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R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15.
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about national identity, history, and value. The status of proportionality as
the grand idea of liberal constitutionalism thus seems seriously troubled
by a social world that resists easy claims about secularism. It is troubled
both in its capacity to carry off the tasks assigned to it and as a description
of what modern constitutionalism demands of the judge. Perhaps it is only
under the conceits of secularism that a scholar can boast of the universality
of proportionality and claim that, ‘[o]n a shrinking planet, it is
appropriately multicultural.’57
The Centrality of Rights Constitutionalism
It is commonplace to observe that the gaze of liberal constitutional
thought has been principally focused on the individual and the character
of the package of fundamental rights and freedoms to which she is
entitled. Rights constitutionalism is imagined as both the core and the
vanguard of modern constitutional thought and practice. This focus on
rights-based protections as the heart of modern constitutionalism is, in
fact, another expression of the ambition to universality at work in the
veneration of proportionality. This is the constitutionalism that is reflected
in Canada in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which now occupies the
centre of public consciousness about what constitutionalism entails. It is
the constitutionalism of the American Bill of Rights and of the package of
‘universal declarations’ that aspire to shape the project of European
constitutionalism. Based, as it is, on more or less universal claims about
the human and human flourishing, liberal rights constitutionalism offers
itself as distinctively mobile, applicable to anyone, anywhere. This
mobility allows for (indeed, invites) substantial borrowing across
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Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law, 168.
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constitutional traditions,
constitutional ideas’.59

58

thereby facilitating the ‘migration of

And yet there is an older – perhaps ‘ancient’ – idea of constitutions
that is centrally concerned with the local, the political, the historically
contingent, and ‘harmonious relations between cultures’ 60 and
communities. This is the sense of constitutions as political devices aimed
at working out local problems among particular interests in a given place.
It reflects a different logic of constitutionalism, one concerned with the
particular, rather than the universal.
Canada is manifestly a child of both logics. Its comparatively new
Charter reflects the drive towards the universal; the much older features of
the constitution that relate to the relationship between the French and
English, its federal structure, and the relationship to Indigenous peoples,
are all expressions of the particular. The insistent trend of modern
constitutionalism has been to privilege the universal through emphasis on
rights constitutionalism. And yet all constitutions are amalgams of both
logics.61
As faith in the categories and conceits of the secular wanes, we are
reminded of the importance – even, perhaps, the centrality – of that ancient
idea of a constitution that is concerned with relationships among
communities, sources of legal authority, and the structural issues of
constitutional law and practice. To be sure, rights constitutionalism
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Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). Hirschl explains that constitutional courts engage in
‘borrowing’ with respect to rights issues far more than structural or formative dimensions of
constitutional law.
59

Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2007).
60

Frank R Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1977) ix.
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Benjamin L Berger, ‘Children of Two Logics: A Way into Canadian Constitutional Culture’
(2013) 11 ICON 319. I argue in this piece that the points at which the march of the logic of
universal reason meets resistance in the particular are key junctures for understanding a country’s
constitutional culture because they are points at which the social and the political, which sit at the
heart of every constitution no matter how modern and committed to universal reason, shine
through.

19

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269536

Forthcoming in Rex Adhar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton,
Mass: Edward Elgar, 2018) (Pre-publication Version)

sweeps up and deals with some matters raised by religious difference. But
freedom of religion and conscience and rights to religious equality have
proven inadequate to the task of sorting through many of the most salient
issues related to the assertive presence of public religion. In this way, the
social facts and issues that have disrupted faith in the secular have also
exposed the misleading nature of imagining that the vanguard and future
of constitutionalism lies in the refinement and development of the
universal logic of rights.
One could make this point by reference to recent experiences of
constitutional design. For countries in which the influence and social
salience of religion cannot be contained within a claim about secularism,
the most complicated set of questions have been of the ‘older’
constitutional variety: what sources of law ought to be acknowledged?
What ought to be the relationships between religious communities and
political authority?62 Legal rights have been something of a side issue. But
as it turns out, this lesson has also emerged out of established
constitutional systems in which rights constitutionalism enjoys a
prominent imaginative profile. Religion has forced such systems to
confront questions drawn from that older, less liberally beguiling, model
of constitutionalism.
Recent years have seen a fascinating institutionalist turn in the
structure of debates about religious difference and constitutionalism.
Confronted with the failure of individual rights of freedom of religion and
conscience to adequately address entire dimensions of the interests and
concerns of religious communities, claims have shifted away from such
rights and towards arguments for the constitutional autonomy and
privileges of religious institutions.63

62

See Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2010).
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On this religious ‘institutionalism’, see Victor Manuel Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of
Pluralism: On the Authority of Associations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014); Victor
Muñiz-Fraticelli and Lawrence David, ‘Religious Institutionalism in a Canadian Context’ (2016)
52 Osgoode Hall LJ 1049; Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson (eds), The Rise
of Corporate Religious Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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One of the most striking examples in this respect is the US case of
Hosanna-Tabor.64 Returning from disability leave to find that the HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church had hired someone to replace her, a
grade school teacher threatened to file suit pursuant to federal antidiscrimination laws. In reaction, the Church fired her, essentially for
‘going to law’. When the case made its way to the courts, the Church
argued that it enjoyed a ‘ministerial exception’, which meant that it was
not subject to legal restrictions in its decisions about its religious leaders.
The unanimous Supreme Court agreed, holding that this ministerial
exception (an aspect of the Establishment Clause) exempted the Church
from federal anti-discrimination protections. Chief Justice Roberts
reasoned that ‘[t]he church must be free to choose those who will guide it
on its way’. 65 As Winnifred Sullivan has pointed out, this turn to ‘the
church’ marks a significant moment in US constitutional law. 66 It
introduces an institutionalist dimension into the management of religious
diversity in the United States, highlighting the entity of ‘church’ in the
constitutional picture, and thereby focusing attention on the deeper
relationship between religion and state and the legitimacy of constitutional
authority over religion. Although integrated into the language of the First
Amendment, this is not essentially a rights-based decision; it is more akin
to a concordat regulating the relationship between the Vatican and the
Italian State than an exercise in modern liberal constitutionalism.
In Canada, the recent Trinity Western case was an instance of this
institutionalist turn in claims for religious freedom. 67 Trinity Western
University is an Evangelical Christian university that sought to establish
the first private, ‘faith-based’ law school in Canada, a project aimed at
affording a Canadian legal education in a ‘Christian learning
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 565 US 171 (2012).
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Ibid, 196.

66

Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, ‘“The Church”’, The Immanent Frame, 31 January 2012
<https://tif.ssrc.org/2012/01/31/the-church/>.
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Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32; Trinity Western
University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33. For a more elaborated account of, and
perspective on, the issues involved in this case, see the chapter by Janet Epp Buckingham in this
Research Handbook, ch 20.
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community’.68 The University requires all community members to sign a
‘community covenant’ that, among other things, prohibits sexual
relationships between same-sex married couples. After charged public
debate, two provincial law societies ultimately denied accreditation to the
law school on the basis that the insistence on this code of conduct
represents a form of institutional discrimination that contravenes legal
guarantees of sexual equality. Drawing inspiration from a recent decision
that represented the Supreme Court’s most extensive recognition of the
collective and social dimensions of freedom of religion,69 Trinity Western
University responded to these denials by noting its institutional exemption
from provincial human rights legislation and arguing that the law
societies’ decisions contravened the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom. Although there was also an individual claimant involved, the
case was, at its heart, about a community’s argument for political
autonomy and institutional independence from public law norms. A
majority of the Supreme Court found against Trinity Western and, though
it essentially evaded this fundamental group rights question in its reasons,
the decision generated a strong dissent and has fed ongoing scholarly and
public controversy about the rights of religious communities vis-à-vis the
state. As the case suggests, religious education is a particular flashpoint for
this institutionalist or collectivist turn, with the complicated confluence of
state and community interests making the set of issues involved in such
cases irreducible to matters of individual rights. 70 Religious education
cases instead require reflection on and negotiation around the relationship
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Trinity Western University Proposed School of Law, ‘Why Trinity Western University’s
School of Law?’ Trinity Western University, <https://www.twu.ca/academics/schoolsfaculties/proposed-school-law>.
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Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, which involved a Roman
Catholic high school’s argument that it should be free to teach the state-mandated Ethics and
Religious Cultures curriculum from a Catholic perspective. A majority of the Court accepted
that the collective dimensions of religious freedom prohibited the government from mandating
how, as a Catholic institution, Loyola taught its own students about Catholicism. The minority
reasons in the case went so far as to hold that the religious organization itself could enjoy the
protection of freedom of religion.
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between religious communities and state authority. Such matters are
inescapably local, historical, political, and particular.71
This renaissance of religious institutions and organizations as a
matter for constitutional reflection is, thus, one example of how the facts
associated with the unsettling of secularism have also destabilized the
centrality of liberal rights constitutionalism in our accounts of modern
constitutional law and practice.
Another such example revolves around questions of legal pluralism
and sources of law. As religion demonstrates its energetic public presence,
the normative dimension of religious life also shows itself, pluralizing law
and putting questions around the recognition of religious legal orders and
the authority and supremacy of state law firmly on the table. These are
emphatically constitutional issues, but are not satisfyingly digestible as
issues of rights constitutionalism.
The debate about ‘sharia arbitration’ in Ontario illustrates this well.
In the fall of 2003, an organization called the Islamic Institute of Civil
Justice proposed the use of arbitration tribunals that would resolve civil
matters – particularly family law and inheritance disputes – through the
application of principles of Islamic law.72 Although the law in Ontario had
permitted private arbitration of disputes based on agreed-upon principles
of law for almost 25 years, this proposal produced something of a ‘moral
panic’ 73 and presented a substantial political question: should Islamic
arbitration be permitted? Faced with strong opposition to the use of
religious law to settle civil disputes, the Government of Ontario
commissioned a report on the matter. Although the report came back
recommending that, with the addition of certain safeguards, religious
arbitration be permitted, the Government ultimately introduced
71

In Canada, Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR 609, sharply dramatized the force of the historical
and particular in matters of religious education, holding that the right to religious funding of
Catholic schools, guaranteed in the 1867 constitution, however discriminatory and reflective of a
state-sponsored privilege for one religion, was immune from attack through doctrines of religious
freedom and equality, reflected in the 1982 Charter.
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I discuss this episode in the modern history of law and religion in Canada at greater length in
Berger, Law’s Religion.
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legislation purporting to ban all religious arbitration, with the Premier
declaring that it would ensure that there was ‘one law for all’.
The claim ‘one law for all’ is an innately constitutional claim. But a
religiously diverse social world, which includes religions for which the
legal dimension of the tradition is robust, means that this claim is at best
aspirational, but certainly not descriptive. Negotiating this condition of
legal pluralism emerges as an important dimension of modern
constitutionalism. We see this in the transnational issue of whether to
enforce religious divorce and family law arrangements through state
courts. In Canada, that issue appeared in the case of Bruker v Markovitz.74
The question was whether to award damages for a husband’s refusal to
provide a ghet. The packaging of this problem as one of religious freedom
belied the real problematic, which was the relationship between ‘secular’
state and religious law. One sees the challenges surrounding that
relationship played out fortissimo in places like Israel and India, where
religious law has formal status in the state legal architecture, but they are
intrinsic to the experience of religious pluralism. These issues flow from
the basic question of how the state should relate to religious legal orders:
a query that reaches back to the kinds of constitutional problems wrestled
with in the wake of the Papal Revolution far more than it reaches forward
into an era of the increasingly universal application of legal rights.
In his account of the challenges associated with the destabilization
of political secularism, Tariq Modood argues that ‘the novelty, which then
has implications for Christians and secularists and to which they are
reacting, is the appearance of an assertive multiculturalism which cannot
be contained within a matrix of individual rights, conscience, religion [sic]
freedom, and so on’.75 Otherwise put, the character and implications of
religious difference have overflowed folk accounts of secularism and, with
it, have evaded the tools of rights constitutionalism. One way of
understanding the nature of this overflowing is that the form of religiosity
that was already ‘bargained for’ in a secularist account buttressed by
individual rights – an internal, believed, private form of religion – no
longer reflects our social lives. And as a result, we find ourselves presented
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with questions whose character and demands disturb accounts of
contemporary constitutionalism in which liberal rights are central.
Legitimacy, Authority, and the Fading Salience of Sovereignty
The capacity of religion to de-centre rights constitutionalism
ultimately points to a third element of the constitutional common sense
that is unsteadied by a social world that resists the claims of secularism:
the fading salience of sovereignty.
The desire to find a ground for the authority and legitimacy of
constitutional law not based in normative visions or identity claims has
been, in large measure, motivated by an awareness of the challenges of
religious difference. That awareness was an explicit impetus for Rawls’
work and it drove the liberal political and legal theory that took its cue
from him. 76 Yet religion has ultimately proven to be a distinctively
powerful device for showing frailties in the idea that an ‘overlapping
consensus’ based on the fruits of public reason can be a satisfying basis for
claims of legal and political authority. The assertive public force of
religious difference has shown the shortcomings of the idea that there is a
road that bypasses historical specificity, identity, ontology, and
metaphysics, but that nevertheless delivers one to a satisfying account of
constitutional legitimacy. The precise point of disruptive intervention has
been to make deeply problematic the tenability of bracketing one’s
‘comprehensive doctrines’ or larger metaphysical and normative
conceptions of the good when engaging in public reasoning – a pivotal
move for the success of such theories. As a phenomenological matter,
religion has simply proven more unruly, more insistently ‘political’, and
generally less containable than the demands for this move allow – the same
realizations that have led to a disruption of faith in secularism.
As cases concerning issues like same-sex marriage, medicallyassisted suicide, and polygamy have accumulated, the idea that
constitutional law can successfully base its claim of legitimacy and
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authority on grounds of law’s neutrality and on reason-based consensus
begin to appear less convincing. Engagement with religious diversity has
exposed constitutionalism as its own cultural enterprise, rich with senses
of the subject, of authority, space, time, and value. 77 Its categories for
analysis and underlying commitments are partial, in both senses of the
word.78 But if convergence and neutrality do not seem up to the task of
underwriting state legal authority, we become aware of a group of legal
subjects returning to those core questions of constitutional law and theory:
‘Why does this bind me?’, ‘What is its authority over me?’ And with this,
I suggest, we are called to examine the abiding role of sovereignty in our
contemporary constitutional lives.
For liberal constitutionalism, appeals to sovereignty have an
antique and even embarrassing feel to them. As Kahn explains, ‘[c]laims
of sovereignty reflect a community’s understanding of itself as embodying
a distinct set of meanings that are substantive not formal, realized at a
particular historical moment, and limited to members’.79 The desire to base
the character and cogency of law in universal reason – a leitmotif in this
chapter – is in part an artefact of the ambition to release us from the burden
of such illiberal claims. ‘Traditionally, sovereignty was thought to precede
law’; 80 the hope of liberal constitutional thought is that, through the
universality of reason and rights, ‘law is to be freed from sovereignty’.81
But with the conventional liberal ground for legitimacy unsettled by
religious diversity, claims for the authority of law based in sovereignty –
the popular sovereignty of ‘who we are’ and ‘what we are’, as Kahn’s
explanation reflects – seem to re-emerge, rushing in to fill the vacuum.
Sovereignty reappears, actively shaping our legal debates and practices; it
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is no longer simply ‘latent in the constitutional state’82 or ‘only an abstract
subject for the ascription of acts of public authority’.83
This is one way of understanding the ‘Islamic headscarf’
controversy in France, centred around the 2003 Stasi Commission report.
Talal Asad tells the story in just this way. He argues that one can look past
the abstract arguments about laïcité to see deeper concerns about the
identity of the French republic and the sovereign character of the state.84
What troubled the state about the ‘appearance’ of the Islamic headscarf
was not the garment itself, but ‘the actor’s will to display it’, 85 which
seemed to symbolize a resistance to the universal character of French
republican identity and the sovereignty of the state built on that identity.
The authority of the resulting legal regulation of the headscarf was not
based on consensus or reason, but on assertions of sovereignty and the
authority of the state.86 This leads Asad to the provocative claim ‘that the
French secular state today abides in a sense by the cuius region eius religio
principle’: 87 whose realm, his religion. Liberal constitutionalism does not
have the tools to reckon with such a governing principle, utterly saturated
as it is by sovereignty. Nor, as a result, does it have a convincing account
for this episode, centrally concerned as it was with the meaning of
symbols, history, and claims about national identity. The authority and
legitimacy of state law’s response to this ‘veil affair’ were not and could
not be found in overlapping consensus or neutrality; instead, however
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embarrassing to a liberal constitutional order, it was to be found in claims
of sovereignty.
In Canada, the continued salience of sovereignty to contemporary
constitutionalism can be seen in a variety of examples involving legal and
political encounters with religious difference and the reckoning with the
instability of the secular. One potent example arises from an ongoing
controversy about the nature and demands of secularism in Quebec, a
controversy that has contours very similar to the French episode that so
interested Asad. In the fall of 2013, a minority sovereigntist Parti
Québécois (PQ) government introduced Bill 60, a bill referred to as the
‘Charter of Québec Values’ or, in much of the debate that ensued, the
‘Charter of Secularism’. 88 This Bill declared the religious neutrality and
secular nature of the state and proposed a contentious prohibition on
employees of public bodies from wearing ‘ostentatious’ or conspicuous
religious symbols, such as turbans, kippot, and headscarves. This
proposed ban charted out a form of secularism for Québec quite at odds
with Canadian multiculturalism, and most agreed that this proposal was
unconstitutional as measured against the rights protections in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The best interpretation of this
move, however, was as part of a continuous constitutional story in Canada
whereby claims about Quebec’s distinctive status in Canadian federalism
and its political independence are based, in part, on a very different
relationship with religion than is found elsewhere in Canada.89 In the early
constitutional life of the country, this unique relationship was Quebec’s
Roman Catholic identity, in contrast to the Protestantism of English
Canada, and this matured into its rejection of multiculturalism and
embrace of a French-style laïcité as its interpretation of the demands of
secularism. Throughout, the structural relationship has remained the
same: distinctiveness within Canadian federalism is asserted by means of
articulating a relationship with religious difference. Such claims, so thick
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with ideas of the identity of the political community, are difficult to digest
within accounts of political and legal liberalism. Rather, they are –
consonant with Kahn’s description of sovereignty claims – reflective of ‘a
community’s understanding of itself as embodying a distinct set of
meanings that are substantive not formal, realized at a particular historical
moment, and limited to members’.90
Many of the examples explored in the previous section similarly
push us into the arms of an account of the authority and legitimacy of
constitutional law not based on convergence or reasonable consensus, but
on assertions of sovereignty. There is a connection between the decentring
of rights constitutionalism and a renewed awareness of the abiding
salience of claims of sovereignty in our constitutional lives. As the former
shifts, we gain a better line of sight on the latter. For example, the questions
of legal pluralism raised by religious difference ultimately call on courts
and other legal actors to account for the relationship of authority between
state law and religious legal orders, a relationship that invites appeals to
sovereignty. This was clear in Premier McGuinty’s claim of ‘one law for
all’ as a response to the sharia arbitration debate: ‘one law for all’ is really
‘one law for all of us’, an assertion that draws out the relations of legal
authority, group membership, and popular sovereignty. Similarly, the
negotiation of the relationship between religious communities and
state/constitutional authority required by the institutionalist turn raises
questions of a character that do not appear resolvable by resort to claims
for constitutional authority based on overlapping consensus or rational
neutrality. The relationship between church and state, the authority of
religious law versus that of constitutional law: these are irreducibly
matters involving questions of sovereignty and call for responses drawn
from that register.
A powerful final example of the way in which claims about religion
have a distinctive capacity to expose the work that sovereignty continues
to do in the practice and structure of constitutional law in Canada comes
from a recent freedom of religion claim involving Indigenous religion. Of
course, sovereignty’s continued role in questions of constitutional justice
is conspicuous in all issues that involve Indigenous peoples. Claims for
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Aboriginal rights, title over land, or the enforcement of historical treaties
all manifestly take place on a terrain of contested sovereignty. What was
unique about the Ktunaxa Nation91 case was that it involved a claim for the
protection of Indigenous religion through the general guarantee of
freedom of religion pursuant to s 2(a) of the Charter. The Ktunaxa asserted
that the government’s approval of a large resort development project in a
region of British Columbia called the Jumbo Valley or, for the Ktunaxa,
Qat’muk, offended their religious freedom. The Ktunaxa believe that the
valley is the home of the Grizzly Bear Spirit, a figure of spiritual
significance to the Ktunaxa, and that the construction of permanent
accommodations would drive the Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk.
Proceeding with the development would, thus, ‘irrevocably impair their
religious beliefs and practices’.92 The Court euphemistically characterizes
this as ‘a novel claim’.93 It was, in fact, a claim with radically subversive
potential. Given the connection between Indigenous religion and the
land, 94 and the wide definition of religious freedom in Canadian
jurisprudence to that point, this claim had profoundly disruptive potential
for the Crown use and control of land and its resources.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the
Ktunaxa’s claim, and did so in a way that points to the energetic work that
state sovereignty claims continue to do in shaping constitutional justice.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rowe, writing for a majority of the
Court, conclude that the Ktunaxa’s claim falls outside the scope of freedom
of religion because they were seeking to protect not their beliefs and
practices, but rather the Grizzly Bear Spirit itself. The majority explains
that ‘the Charter protects the freedom to worship, but does not protect the
spiritual focal point of worship’.95 But of course, unlike the other traditions
with which the Court is accustomed in its freedom of religion
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jurisprudence, the ‘spiritual focal point of worship’ for the Ktunaxa is
vulnerable to state interference: the Grizzly Bear Spirit is tied to the land.
Justice Moldaver, in separate reasons, rightly points to this distinguishing
feature, explaining that ‘[f]or Indigenous religions, state action that
impacts land can therefore sever the connection to the divine, rendering
beliefs and practices devoid of their spiritual significance’.96 The majority’s
approach, therefore, ‘risks foreclosing the protections of s. 2(a) of the
Charter to substantial elements of Indigenous religious traditions’.97 And
yet, though he would have therefore found that the approval infringed the
Ktunaxa’s freedom of religion, Justice Moldaver justified the government’s
decision as ‘reasonable in the circumstances’. 98 His reasons expose the
extent to which the result in this case is underwritten by legitimizing a
priori sovereignty claims. To accede to the Ktunaxa’s claim would allow
them ‘to veto development over the land’99 and ‘would effectively transfer
the public’s control of the use of over fifty square kilometres of land to the
Ktunaxa’.100 Justice Moldaver explains:
This placed the Minister in a difficult, if not impossible,
position. He determined that if he granted the power of
exclusion to the Ktunaxa, this would significantly hamper, if
not prevent, him from fulfilling his statutory objectives: to
administer Crown land and to dispose of it in the public
interest.101
The pivotal phrase here is ‘Crown land’. Is Qat’muk Crown land to be
disposed of in the public interest? That question – the status of that land
and the sovereignty claim over it – is the irreducible political core of such
disputes between the state and Indigenous peoples. Although this is
somewhat less obvious in the majority’s decision owing to the choice to
treat this as a matter of the scope of the right rather than one of justification,

96

Ibid, [127].

97

Ibid, [131].

98

Ibid, [155].

99

Ibid, [150].

100

Ibid, [152].

101

Ibid, [154].

31

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269536

Forthcoming in Rex Adhar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton,
Mass: Edward Elgar, 2018) (Pre-publication Version)

the effacing of the link between land and religion evidences similar
concerns and preoccupations. A tantalizing tell comes in the majority’s
initial description of the facts. The majority explains that the area in
dispute ‘is located in a Canadian valley in the northwestern part of the
larger Ktunaxa territory’.102 Is it a ‘Canadian valley’ or is it part of ‘Ktunaxa
territory’? The shearing forces within this facially anodyne statement are
the forces exerted by sovereignty claims. Imaginatively, both decisions
begin from an assertion of state sovereignty over the land; they proceed
from, are shaped by, and ultimately return to that imaginative foundation.
Each of these examples demonstrates the way in which a public and
political pertinence of religion that is incommensurable with folk claims
about political secularism disrupts a treasured conceit of liberal
constitutional thought and practice: that the work of constitutional justice
can be done, and can be understood, without recourse to the kinds of claims
about historical particularity, community identity, and – yes – metaphysics
and ontology, associated with assertions of sovereign authority. They
challenge accounts of modern constitutionalism premised on ‘the minor
importance of the concept of sovereignty to the interpretation and
application of constitutions’.103 In each example, the work of contending
with religion reveals that more constitutional justice than we are
comfortable admitting is shaped by conceptions and claims of sovereignty.
As the picture of the social world painted by a simple story of secularism
becomes more complicated and less plausible, so too does the wish for a
constitutionalism that is ‘freed from sovereignty’.104
CONCLUSION
Liberal constitutional theory and practice has, I have argued,
proceeded on an unacknowledged faith in a certain conception of the
secular that is reasonably descriptive of the place of religion in
contemporary society, and where not descriptive, at least affords a
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reasonably coherent regulative ideal. Yet the facts surrounding the abiding
public presence and assertiveness of religion in our social and political
lives resist that description, and the concept of the secular has proven too
complex, variable, and untidy to offer stable footing. The faith thus
disrupted, certain features of our constitutional theory and practice
themselves become unsettled. Proportionality seems troubled both in its
capacity to carry off the task assigned to it and as a description of the
central feature of modern constitutional adjudication, which, in matters of
religion, seems to be a practice thick with symbolic interpretation
informed by claims about identity and history. Rights constitutionalism
assumes a more modest position within the features of modern
constitutional life, with structural issues that wrestle with the presence of
multiple salient sources of normative ordering coming into our field of
view. And confidence in the fading salience of sovereignty as a player in
the structure of constitutional authority and legitimacy seems ill placed.
Philip Selznick once described the sociology of law ‘as an attempt
to marshal what we know about the natural elements of social life and to
bring that knowledge to bear on a consciously sustained enterprise,
governed by special objectives and ideals’.105 Martin Krygier explains that
in describing the features of social life as ‘natural’, Selznick meant to
capture the idea that ‘[s]ociety is a natural, if naturally variable, response
to the character and coincidence of human nature, needs, strivings, and
particular circumstances’. 106 Approached as ‘a consciously sustained
enterprise, governed by special objectives and ideals’, law, for Selznick, ‘is
a kind of activity carried on by living [people] in living institutions, subject
to all the external pressures and constraints, and all the inner sources of
recalcitrance, that frustrate ideal ends’. 107 Selznick’s particular
understanding of the task of legal sociology was, thus, to bring the ideals,
objectives, and project of law into conversation with what we know about
the real circumstances, needs, and character of social life.
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This chapter participates in a genre of constitutional reflection that
is inspired by a similar sociological instinct. It is a genre that seeks to hold
our constitutional practices, theories, and common sense to the discipline
of actually accounting for the social world with which constitutions
interact. James Tully does this, turning his eyes to the global south and the
lived experiences of imperialism and colonialism, arguing for new ways
of theorizing and practicing constitutionalism.108 Similarly, John Borrows
expertly draws out the ‘needs, strivings, and particular circumstances’ of
Indigenous peoples to point to the inadequacy of prevailing constitutional
theories and practices, and to urge a new understanding and orientation
to our constitutional lives.109
This chapter has sought to do something of the same character,
asking what we learn when we marshal what we know about the
complexity and untidiness of the role of religion in modern society and
bring that knowledge to bear on the enterprise of liberal constitutionalism
in a social world that resists any straightforward application of the label
‘secular’.
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